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I. Introduction 
Section 37 of the Lanham Act vests courts with the power to order the Direc-
tor of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to cancel trademark registra-
tions.1  This power to “rectify the register”2 is discretionary, and since the act’s en-
actment in 1946, courts have routinely granted cancellation requests when the 
trademark’s invalidity was established in the trial court proceedings.  However, that 
is not always the outcome.  Some courts refuse to exercise their power to rectify the 
register under section 37 even with a proven and valid basis for cancellation. 
This article examines cases where the district courts refused to cancel invalid 
trademarks even though a basis for cancellation had been established.  In some cas-
es, the appellate courts have reversed, holding that this was an abuse of discretion.  
In others, the Courts of Appeals have affirmed the refusal to cancel.  Why the dif-
ference?  The distinguishing fact appears to be that in cases where cancellation was 
ultimately ordered, the party seeking cancellation affirmatively sought cancellation 
via a cause of action—typically a counterclaim in an infringement suit.  In cases 
where cancellation was ultimately rejected, the common theme seems to be that the 
party did not request cancellation as a claim, but instead requested cancellation as a 
remedy in a motion. 
This article takes a close look at the claim requirement and argues that not on-
ly should a party not have to file a claim, but also courts should exercise their sec-
tion 37 cancellation powers sua sponte when a mark’s invalidity has already been 
proved.  Additionally, on appeal, a failure to cancel under section 37 when invalid-
ity has been established should be characterized as a per se abuse of discretion.  
These sensible proposals benefit the public by driving down producers’ costs and 
consumer prices  and freeing up already overburdened administrative resources, 
while only placing a negligible burden on the courts, and they do not pose the same 
problems that typically cause objections to sua sponte action.  Moreover, a sua 
sponte cancellation requirement will not require judges to engage in complex statu-
tory interpretation.  These proposals can easily be read consistently with section 
37’s existing language. 
In Part II, I briefly introduce the trademark registration system and point out 
the benefits of registration to both trademark owners and the public.  In Part III, I 
discuss the cancellation system for registered trademarks, including the two cancel-
lation methods (before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) and the 
1   Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946 § 37, 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (2006). 
2   Id. 
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courts), the grounds for cancellation, and the procedures for seeking cancellation 
before the TTAB. 
In Part IV, I review the case law where cancellation under section 37 was ini-
tially refused and explore why some refusals were affirmed while others were re-
versed—ultimately concluding that a failure to file a claim is the distinguishing fac-
tor.  I further illustrate in this part why refusing to cancel the registration puts an 
additional burden on the litigant seeking cancellation, why the litigant may rea-
sonably shirk this burden, and how this ultimately harms the public. 
Finally, in Part V, I explain the proposals discussed above, detailing how 
these proposals are more efficient, how they advance trademark law’s purpose, and 
how courts can easily implement them.  Ultimately, I urge district courts to adopt a 
standard practice of ordering cancellation when the registered mark has been found 
invalid, and for the Courts of Appeals or Supreme Court to adopt a per se abuse of 
discretion standard for such a circumstance.  Alternatively, Congress should amend 
section 37 to reflect these proposals. 
II. Trademark Registration 
Before delving into how trademarks are canceled, it makes sense to first dis-
cuss what is being canceled: the trademark’s federal registration with the PTO.  
Complicating matters, though, is the United States’ dual system of trademark law.3  
Trademark owners can obtain trademark rights under state and federal law.4  Our 
focus is largely on the federal system. 
The federal system is governed by the Lanham Act and permits trademark 
owners to try to register their marks on the Principal Register.5  The Principal Reg-
ister is a public record of registered marks that aims to serve as a complete and cen-
tralized list of marks.6  By maintaining the Principal Register, the public is able to 
3   ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, 
PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 550 (2003). 
4   Id. 
5   See Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946 §§ 1–45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–129 (2006). 
6   3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:2 (4th ed. 
2009).  Because federal registration is optional, the Principal Register falls short of its goal of be-
ing a complete list of trademarks.  See id. at § 19.6 (discussing the need to search beyond the Prin-
cipal Register to “avoid liability for infringement”).  As a result, some common-law marks may 
exist but are not listed on the Principal Register.  See id. 
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easily search and determine what marks are available for registration.7  Registering 
marks on the Principal Register not only benefits the public, but also provides 
trademark owners with additional benefits.8  However, because the U.S. has a dual 
system of trademark protection, registering a mark on the Principal Register is not 
required.9 
To help create a complete and centralized list of marks, the Lanham Act en-
courages trademark owners to federally register their marks by conferring several 
advantages and protections not otherwise available to unregistered marks.10  For 
example, registration on the Principal Register is prima facie evidence that the mark 
is valid and owned by the registrant.11  Furthermore, registration is prima facie evi-
dence of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in connection with the 
goods or services described in the certificate of registration.12  Another valuable 
protection afforded by registration is that a mark registered on the Principal Regis-
ter may become incontestable after five years of continuous use.13  A mark’s status 
as incontestable constitutes conclusive evidence of the validity, ownership, and 
right to use the registered mark in commerce in connection with the goods or ser-
7   Id. § 19:2 (quoting Bongrain Int’l (Am.) Corp. v. Delice de France, Inc. 811 F.2d 1479, 1485 
(Fed. Cir. 1987)).  Prior to the establishment of the Principal Register, the private sector main-
tained a similar list called the “Thomson Register.”  Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The 
End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 585, 598 (2008).  Companies claimed trademark 
rights and made those rights known to the world by having their marks appear on the Thomson 
Register.  Id.  Although the Thomson Register was a popular form of deterrence, the problem was, 
of course, that registration had no legal effect.  Id. 
8   3 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 19:9. 
9   3 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 19:3. 
10   In re Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 183 F.3d 1361, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  For a discussion 
of the benefits of federal registration, see Todd Anten, Note, Self-Disparaging Trademarks and 
Social Change: Factoring the Reappropriation of Slurs into Section 2(A) of the Lanham Act, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 388, 396–98 (2006). 
11   Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946 §§ 7, 33, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(b), 1115(a) (2006). 
12   Id.  
13   15 U.S.C. § 1065.  For additional information on incontestability, see F.T. Alexandra Mahaney, 
Comment, Incontestability: The Park ‘N Fly Decision, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1163–69 (1986). 
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vices described in the certificate of registration.14  Other registration benefits in-
clude: 
! providing constructive notice of a claim of mark ownership,15 which gives 
priority over junior users even in locations where the registrant has not used 
the mark;16 
! providing a constructive use date, resulting in nationwide priority as of the re-
gistrant’s application filing date;17 
! improving the ability to block imported goods bearing an infringing mark;18 
! permitting the registrant to use the ® symbol and other registration notices;19 
! providing a broader array of remedies;20 and 
! serving as a basis for foreign registrations under the Paris Convention21 and 
Madrid Protocol.22 
These additional protections afforded by the Lanham Act were designed to encour-
age trademark owners to register their marks with the PTO and not simply rely on 
their common-law protection.23 
The public also benefits from registration.  As noted supra, registration on the 
Principal Register makes it easier for the public to search and determine what 
14   Id. § 1115(b) (2006).  Despite the finality conjured up by the term “incontestable” and the fact that 
the evidence is “conclusive,” there is a variety of exceptions to incontestability.  See id. at 
§ 1115(b)(1)–(9). 
15   Id. at § 1072. 
16   5 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 26:33 (citing Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 
358, 365 (2d Cir. 1959)). 
17   Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946 §7, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c). 
18   15 U.S.C. § 1124. 
19   Id. § 1111.  The other forms of notice include “Registered in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office” 
and “Reg. U.S. Pat. & Tm. Off.”  Id.  
20   Id. §§ 1116(d), 1117(b), 1117(c). 
21   Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 6 quinquies, Sept. 5, 1970, 21 
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
22   World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], The Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Reg-
istration of Marks and the Protocol Relating to that Agreement: Objectives, Main Features, Ad-
vantages, at 4, WIPO Publ’n No. 418(E) (2008). 
23   In re Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 183 F.3d 1361, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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r 
welfare.  
III. 
 
inistrative proceeding before the TTAB.   The second is a judi-
cial proceeding.33 
 
marks are available.24  Businesses that promote their products and services may 
search the Principal Register to determine whether a particular mark is available for 
use.25  Doing so allows them to avoid spending substantial amounts of time, en-
ergy, and money promoting and using a mark they are not entitled to use.26  Run-
ning a search can help companies avoid liability for trademark infringement and 
minimize their costs of wrangling with the PTO about whether a particular mark 
can be registered.27  These savings benefit not only businesses but also consum-
ers.28  Because resources are not wasted and search costs are lowered by an exten-
sive registry, business costs are lowered, resulting in lower prices for consumers.29  
These efficiencies reflect trademark law’s broader purpose: to increase consume
30
Cancellation 
Just as a mark can be registered and confer benefits on the registrant and the 
public, a mark can also be removed from the Principal Register via a procedure 
called cancellation.31  As explained infra, several grounds exist for canceling a reg-
istration, and the Lanham Act provides two procedural avenues for cancellation. 
The first is an adm 32
24   See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
25   In re Int’l Flavors, 183 F.3d at 1367 (quoting Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 
760 F.2d 1383, 1395 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
26   Id. 
27   3 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 19:6. 
28   In re Int’l Flavors, 183 F.3d at 1367. 
29 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 
54 EMORY L.J. 461, 466–67 (2005).  
30   Id.  (“Trademark law therefore represents an affirmation of, rather than a departure from, the 
competitive model that drives the U.S. economy.  Like antitrust laws, false advertising laws, and 
other consumer protection statutes, trademark law both draws from and reinforces the notion that 
competitive markets, under ordinary circumstances, will ensure efficient resource allocation and 
bring consumers the highest quality products at the lowest prices.”). 
31   3 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 20:40.  
32   See infra Part III.B. 
33   See infra Part III.C.  
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A. Grounds for Cancellation 
Before describing the processes for canceling a registration, understanding the 
grounds for cancellation is necessary.  Cancellations are governed by section 14 of 
the Lanham Act, which breaks cancellation inquiries into two time periods: within 
five years of registration and any time after registration.34 
For marks registered for less than five years, the Lanham Act does not enu-
merate the available grounds for cancellation.35  However, courts and the TTAB 
have fleshed out these grounds over time.36  In general, a registration may be can-
celed if the mark would be statutorily barred from registration under section 2 of 
the Lanham Act,37 or if the mark falls within one of the delineated grounds under 
which registrations can be canceled at any time.38   
Section 2 sets forth many statutory bars prohibiting marks from initially being 
registered, including, inter alia, that the mark (1) is immoral, deceptive, scandalous, 
or disparaging;39 (2) consists of a national, state, or municipal flag or insignia;40 (3) 
consists of the name, portrait, or signature of certain individuals;41 (4) is likely to 
cause confusion with existing marks;42 (5) is merely descriptive,43 misdescriptive, 
34   Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(1)–(2), (3)–(5). 
35   4A LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND 
MONOPOLIES § 26:53 (4th ed. 2009). 
36   3 MCCARTHY, supra note 6 § 20:52.  
37   15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2006). 
38   3 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 20:52; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3)–(5). 
39   15 U.S.C. § 1052(a); see, e.g., Daesang Corp. v. Rhee Bros., Inc., No. Civ. AMD 03-551, 2005 
WL 1163142, *11–12 (D. Md. May 13, 2005) (cancellation granted). 
40   15 U.S.C. § 1052(b). 
41   Id. § 1052(c); see, e.g., Chester L. Krause, Cancellation No. 92041171, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1904 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 18, 2005), 2005 TTAB Lexis 487, at *17, *36 (cancellation granted). 
42   15 U.S.C. § 1052(d); see, e.g., Colonial Williamsburg Found., Cancellation No. 92047662, 2009 
WL 391629, at *3–*6 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 4, 2009) (cancellation granted). 
43   Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 197 (1985) (“Pursuant to § 14, a mark 
may be canceled on the grounds that it is merely descriptive only if the petition to cancel is filed 
within five years of the date of registration.”); see, e.g., Osho Friends Int’l, Cancellation No. 
92031932, 2009 WL 129558, at *15–17 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 13, 2009) (cancellation granted). 
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functional,44 or primarily merely a surname;45 or (6) would likely cause dilution by 
blurring or tarnishment.46  Notwithstanding that these types of marks are barred 
from registration, some of these statutory bars can be overcome by showing secon-
dary meaning—that is, that the public associates the mark with the producer or 
supplier of the goods or services.47  Unless eligible to be saved and actually saved 
by secondary meaning, a mark registered for less than five years is subject to can-
cellation on any of these grounds. 
The other statutory basis for cancellation applies to all registered marks, re-
gardless of how long they have been registered.48  Section 14(3) allows a registra-
tion to be canceled at any time if the mark has become generic,49 functional,50 or 
abandoned;51 was obtained fraudulently52 or contrary to the provisions of sections 
2(a), (b), or (c); or is being used to misrepresent the source of the goods or ser-
vices.53  Thus, for marks registered for more than five years, the grounds for can-
44   See, e.g., Fuji Kogyo Co., Ltd. v. Pac. Bay Int’l, Inc., 461 F.3d 675, 683 (6th Cir. 2006) (cancella-
tion affirmed). 
45   15 U.S.C. § 1052(e); see, e.g., Williamson-Dickie Mfg. Co. v. Davis Mfg. Co., 149 F. Supp. 852, 
853–54 (E.D. Pa. 1957), aff’d, 251 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1958) (cancellation granted). 
46   15 U.S.C. § 1052(f); see, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Spam Arrest, LLC, Cancellation No. 
92042134, 2007 WL 4287254, at *23 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 21, 2007) (cancellation dismissed).  The sta-
tutory bar for dilution was added in 1999, but amended in 2006 to reflect that the standard was a 
likelihood of dilution rather than actual dilution.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (as amended by 120 Stat. 
1732 (2006)). 
47   15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).  In particular, marks that are merely descriptive, primarily geographically 
descriptive, and primarily merely a surname are eligible for registration upon a showing of secon-
dary meaning.  1 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 4:12. 
48   Id. § 1064. 
49   Park ‘N Fly v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) (“Generic terms are not regis-
terable, and a registered mark may be canceled at any time on the grounds that it has become ge-
neric.”); see, e.g., Osho Friends Int’l, 2009 WL 129558, at *15–*17 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 13, 2009) 
(cancellation granted). 
50   See, e.g., Fuji Kogyo Co., Ltd. v. Pac. Bay Int’l, Inc., 461 F.3d 675, 683 (6th Cir. 2006) (cancella-
tion affirmed). 
51   See, e.g., Colonial Williamsburg Found., 2009 WL 391629, at *6–*7 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 4, 2009) 
(cancellation granted). 
52   See, e.g., Sierra Sunrise Vineyards v. Montelvini S.P.A., Cancellation No. 92048154, 2008 WL 
4371318, at *2–*6 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 10, 2008) (cancellation granted). 
53   Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946 § 14(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2006).  Sections 14(4) and (5) 
can also be asserted at any time, but are limited to specific scenarios involving marks registered 
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cellation are limited to those in section 14(3).54  For marks registered for less than 
five years, the section 14(3) grounds are available as well as those listed in section 
2.55  A party has two methods for asserting these grounds for cancellation: an ad-
ministrative cancellation before the TTAB under section 14 or a judicial cancella-
tion under section 56
It is important to note that just because a registration is canceled does not 
mean that the mark is invalid or that the trademark owner has no rights.57  Cancel-
lation and invalidity are distinct but overlapping concepts.  Cancellation takes away 
only the registration benefits, not the underlying trademark rights.58  Because 
trademark law is based on both the Lanham Act and the common law, a canceled 
registration may still leave the trademark owner with a protectable common law 
mark that can be enforced against others.59  However, if the mark is determined to 
be invalid, then there are no trademark rights to assert under the Lanham Act or un-
der the common law.60  The primary grounds for invalidity, which overlap to a cer-
tain extent with the bases for cancellation, include marks that are or have become 
generic,61 are merely descriptive without secondary meaning,62 are functional,63 or 
under the Trademark Acts of 1881 and 1905 and certification marks, respectively.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1064(4)–(5). 
54   Id. at § 1064(3). 
55   Id. at §§ 1064, 1052. 
56   Id. at §§ 1064, 1119. 
57   3 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 20:40.  
58   3 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 20:40.  
59   See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 20:40.  
60   Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 930 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(“[T]o prevail under §§ 32(1) and 43(a) of the Lanham Act for trademark infringement and unfair 
competition, respectively, a complainant must demonstrate that it has a valid, protectible trade-
mark.”); Cmty. State Bank, Nat’l Assoc. v. Cmty. State Bank, 758 N.W.2d 520, 525 (Iowa 2008) 
(“[T]o succeed on a common law trademark infringement claim and obtain injunctive relief, the 
plaintiff must prove (1) it has a valid trademark, and (2) infringement by the defendant.”). 
61   3 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 12:1 (“In short, a generic name of a product can never function as a 
trademark to indicate origin.”). 
62   3 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 11:15 (“Today, the law is that marks categorized as ‘descriptive’ 
cannot be protected unless secondary meaning is proven.”).  
63   Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995) (“This Court consequently has ex-
plained that, ‘[i]n general terms, a product feature is functional,’ and cannot serve as a trademark, 
‘if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article,’ 
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have been abandoned.64  If a mark is found to be invalid, then the owner has no 
trademark rights to assert and the registration should be canceled.65  This article is 
concerned with only the subset of marks determined to be invalid, not all registra-
tions vulnerable to cancellation. 
B. TTAB Cancellations - Section 14 
A cancellation proceeding before the TTAB is similar to a civil suit in court.  
To commence cancellation before the TTAB, the party seeking cancellation must 
file a petition for cancellation along with the required fee.66  The petition must set 
forth a short and plain statement why the party believes it is or will be damaged by 
the registration and state the grounds for cancellation.67  After filing the petition, 
the party must serve the petition on the mark owner or the owner’s domestic repre-
sentative.68 
Once the petition is in its proper form and the fees are filed, the TTAB for-
mally notifies the parties of the proceeding and sets a period, not less than thirty 
days, in which an answer must be filed.69  The notice also specifies the opening and 
closing dates for discovery and taking testimony.70  Discovery in cancellation pro-
ceedings before the TTAB largely mirrors the procedures and rules used in the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.71  Discovery conferences are held;72 initial disclo-
sures must be made;73 and the parties to the cancellation may utilize depositions, 
that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related 
disadvantage.” (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982))). 
64   3 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 17:1 (“Once held abandoned, a mark falls into the public domain 
and is free for all to use.”). 
65   See Gracie v. Gracie, 217 F.3d 1060, 1065–66 (9th Cir. 2000). 
66   Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2006); 37 C.F.R. § 2.111(a) (2008).  
The required cancellation fee is currently $300 per class.  37 C.F.R. § 2.6(a)(16) (2008). 
67   37 C.F.R. § 2.112(a) (2008).   
68   Id. at § 2.111(a). 
69   Id. at § 2.113(a). 
70   Id. at § 2.120(a). 
71   Id. at § 2.120(a)(1) (“Wherever appropriate, the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
relating to disclosure and discovery shall apply in . . . cancellation . . . proceedings except as oth-
erwise provided in this section.”). 
72   Id. at § 2.120(a)(2). 
73   37 C.F.R. § 2.120(a)(2)–(3) (2008). 
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interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admissions.74  After dis-
covery closes, the parties submit trial testimony to the TTAB75 and are allowed 
time to file briefs to further present their case in light of the relevant law.76  If time-
ly requested, the parties also have the opportunity to present oral arguments in sup-
port of their cases.77  Oral arguments are heard by at least three TTAB members.78  
Following oral arguments, the case is set for final decision and a panel of at least 
three TTAB members renders the final decision.79  Requests for reconsideration, 
rehearing, or modification of a decision can be made, but must be filed within one 
month from the decision date.80  Judicial review is also available to an aggrieved 
party.81 
C. Judicial Cancellations - Section 37 
The second method for canceling a registration is via a judicial cancellation 
under section 37 of the Lanham Act.  Section 37 provides: 
In any action involving a registered mark the court may determine the right to 
registration, order the cancelation of registrations, in whole or in part, restore 
canceled registrations, and otherwise rectify the register with respect to the regis-
trations of any party to the action.  Decrees and orders shall be certified by the 
court to the Director, who shall make appropriate entry upon the records of the 
Patent and Trademark Office, and shall be controlled thereby.82 
Section 37 gives courts the power to order the PTO to cancel a registration.83  It is 
typically invoked by a defendant in an infringement action who files a counterclaim 
against the plaintiff and seeks to have the plaintiff’s registration canceled.84  An ac-
74   Id. at § 2.120(a). 
75   See generally id. at §§ 2.123–2.126 (discussing issues related to trial testimony). 
76   Id. at § 2.128. 
77   Id. at § 2.129. 
78   Id. at § 2.129(a). 
79   U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF 
PROCEDURE (TBMP) § 803 (2004). 
80   37 C.F.R. § 2.129(c) (2008). 
81   Id. at § 2.145. 
82   Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946 § 37, 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (2006). 
83   Id. 
84   See, e.g., Cent. Mfg. Inc. v. Brett, 492 F.3d 876, 883 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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tion that only asserts a claim for cancellation will be dismissed.85  The reason is that 
courts refuse to hear cancellation claims without some other independent basis for 
jurisdiction.86  Therefore, before a party can take advantage of section 37, it must 
either (1) have an independent basis, such as being sued for infringement or filing a 
valid declaratory judgment action for a finding of non-infringement, or (2) have ex-
hausted its administrative remedies by bringing a cancellation action before the 
TTAB.87  Section 37’s purpose is efficiency-based.  If a judicial proceeding is al-
ready underway and the propriety of the mark’s registration is being litigated, com-
bining the analysis into one proceeding will “prevent[] vexatious and harassing liti-
gation as well as sav[e] time, expense, and inconvenience to the parties and to the 
courts and [PTO] tribunals.”88 
Section 37’s effect is to give courts concurrent power with the TTAB to can-
cel registrations and maintain the Principal Register.89  Although there is a paucity 
of language in section 37 defining courts’ grounds for ordering cancellation, the 
courts have held that they are limited to the same substantive grounds for cancella-
tion as the TTAB.90  That is, courts have no broader power to order cancellations 
than the TTAB does.91  Therefore, a party seeking cancellation under section 37 
must establish one of the grounds for cancellation under section 14, which can be 
asserted at any time, or one of the grounds under section 2 if the mark has been reg-
istered for less than five years.92  Moreover, as is required in TTAB cancellations, a 
85   5 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 30:110; see, e.g., Ditri v. Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, 
Inc., 954 F.2d 869, 873–74 (3d Cir. 1992), Global DNS, LLC v. Kook’s Custom Headers, Inc., 
No. C08-0268RL, 2008 WL 4380439, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 22, 2008) (citing Universal Sew-
ing Mach. Co. v. Standard Sewing Equip. Corp., 185 F. Supp.  257, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)). 
86   See 4A ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 35, § 26:53. 
87   4A ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 35, § 26:53; see also Universal Sewing, 185 F. Supp. at 260 
(holding that a suit for cancellation could not independently be maintained in federal court). 
88   Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp. of Am., 257 F.2d 485, 491 (3d Cir. 
1958). 
89   See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 30:109.  
90   See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 30:112. 
91   See Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 9 F.3d 1091, 1092 (4th Cir. 1993) (superseded on 
other grounds by statute) (“We hold that Congress adopted [section 37] to give the district court 
power concurrent with, but not in excess of, the Patent and Trademark Review Board and that the 
district court is also limited by the language of the statutes controlling the Board.”). 
92   See supra Part III.A. 
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party seeking a judicial cancellation must establish that it is or will be damaged by 
the mark’s continued registration.93 
IV. An Illogical Limitation on Judicial Cancellations 
Although section 37 grants the courts power to cancel registrations, courts do 
not always exercise this power even after declaring a mark invalid.  As illustrated 
below, the reason for refusing to grant such cancellations appears to be that the par-
ty seeking cancellation failed to assert its request for cancellation as a claim, and 
instead requested cancellation via some other procedure.94  This rationale for courts 
refusing to exercise their section 37 power does not make much sense.  It frustrates 
the Principal Register’s purpose, and may harm businesses and consumers by driv-
ing up the costs and prices of goods and services or by impeding new product de-
velopment. 
A. Refusals to Cancel 
Despite having the power to cancel a registration based on an invalid trade-
mark, some courts refuse to exercise it and are affirmed on appeal, while others re-
fuse to exercise it and are reversed.  What accounts for the different results? 
In OBX-Stock, Inc. v. Bicast, Inc., the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s refusal to cancel the plaintiff’s registration for the mark OBX despite the 
district court’s finding that the mark was either generic or geographically descrip-
tive without secondary meaning.95  The plaintiff began using the letters OBX on 
oval stickers for automobiles and soon attached these letters to a variety of souve-
nirs and other sundries.96  The letters OBX were chosen by the plaintiff to stand for 
the Outer Banks of North Carolina.97  The Outer Banks is a geographical region 
consisting of approximately 200 miles of barrier islands off the North Carolina 
coast, which is popular among vacationers.98  The plaintiff eventually registered 
OBX as a mark in connection with a range of goods and services.99  The defendant 
93   Scott v. Mego Int’l, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 1118, 1139 (D. Minn. 1981). 
94   See infra Part IV.A. 
95   OBX-Stock, Inc. v. Bicast, Inc., 558 F.3d 334, 342–43 (4th Cir. 2009). 
96   Id. at 337.  
97   Id.  
98   Id.  
99   Id.  The goods and services include stickers, metal license plates, sports clothing, magnets, com-
puter mouse pads, bottle openers, bottled drinking water, and entertainment services in the nature 
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also began selling stickers but used the text “OB Xtreme.”100  Believing “OB 
Xtreme” infringed its OBX mark, the plaintiff filed suit.101 
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment attacking the validity of 
the OBX mark.102  The district court granted the motion, holding that plaintiff’s 
OBX mark had become generic or was geographically descriptive without secon-
dary meaning.103  Notwithstanding its conclusion that the mark was invalid, the dis-
trict court refused to cancel the OBX registrations.104 
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the plaintiff argued the OBX mark was valid, 
and the defendant cross-appealed, challenging the district court’s refusal to cancel 
the registrations.105  The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s OBX mark was in-
valid because it was geographically descriptive without secondary meaning.106  
With respect to the defendant’s cross-appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to exercise its power under section 37 
and affirmed the district court’s ruling.107  The Fourth Circuit justified the refusal to 
cancel by explaining that (1) the defendant’s evidence did not conclusively estab-
lish that every one of the plaintiff’s registrations should be canceled; (2) the defen-
dant never filed a claim for cancellation, but instead chose to argue the point in its 
motion for summary judgment; and (3) the defendant received an adequate remedy 
through the judgment in its favor.108 
Taking a closer look at these rationales suggests that the failure to file a claim 
was the only purportedly “legitimate” reason for failing to order the cancellation.  
The first reason, that the defendant’s evidence did not conclusively establish that 
every one of plaintiff’s registrations should be canceled, overlooks the fact that 
of conducting and sponsoring music festivals, chili cook-off contests, ethnic festivals, fishing con-
tests, and boat racing.  Id. at 338 n.*.  
100  Id. at 337.  
101  OBX-Stock, Inc. v. Bicast, Inc., 558 F.3d 334, 337 (4th Cir. 2009). 
102  Id. at 339. 
103  Id. 
104  Id. 
105  Id.  
106  Id. at 342.  
107  OBX-Stock, Inc. v. Bicast, Inc., 558 F.3d 334, 342–43 (4th Cir. 2009). 
108  Id.  
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there was conclusive evidence for at least some of the registrations at issue.  In fact, 
that was the reason for granting the defendant’s summary judgment motion in the 
first place; the marks were invalid as generic or geographically descriptive.109  The 
district court did not find the OBX mark to be invalid for some products but valid 
for others.  It simply found that the term OBX was being used to describe a location 
rather than serving as a trademark and indicating the goods’ source.110  Even if it 
were true that some of the registered marks were valid, why not cancel the registra-
tions of the invalid marks?  As explained infra, no efficiencies are gained by requir-
ing the defendant to petition for cancellation before the TTAB.111  Thus, the Fourth 
Circuit’s first reason for refusing cancellation seems to be incorrect at worst and a 
non sequitur at best.  The third reason, that the defendant received an adequate re-
medy through the judgment in its favor,112 may be true.  Nevertheless, it ignores 
both the efficiencies of ordering the cancellation and, perhaps more important, the 
burdens imposed on other businesses, the public, and the TTAB.  These concerns 
are addressed in more detail below.113  Because the first and third rationales do not 
make much sense from a legal, logical, or efficiency perspective, the only remain-
ing rationale for refusing to order the cancellation is that instead of filing a claim 
for cancellation, the defendant requested cancellation as part of its motion for 
summary judgment.114 
Similarly, in Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, the district court held that 
the plaintiff’s registered mark for motorcycles, HOG, was generic, but the court re-
fused to cancel the registration.115  Harley-Davidson , the plaintiff, claimed that the 
defendant, a motorcycle repair company, infringed its HOG mark.116  Initially, the 
district court found in the plaintiff’s favor, but on appeal, the Second Circuit re-
versed and held that the plaintiff’s mark was generic.117  Based on the Second Cir-
109  Id. at 339.  
110  Id. at 340–41. 
111  See infra Part IV.B.  
112  OBX-Stock, 558 F.3d at 342–43. 
113  See infra Parts IV(B)–(C). 
114  According to the defendant’s trial counsel, the defendant requested cancellation in its Amended 
Answer, although not styled as a counterclaim.  E-mail from David Sar, Trial Counsel for Defen-
dant Bicast, Inc., to author (June 3, 2009, 06:15 PST) (on file with author). 
115  Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 91 F. Supp. 2d 544, 547 (W.D.N.Y. 2000). 
116  Id. at 546. 
117  Id. at 545 (citing Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 811 (2d Cir. 1999).  
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cuit’s ruling, the defendant, on remand to the district court, requested cancellation 
of the plaintiff’s registrations.118  Although acknowledging that courts cancel regis-
trations when a mark is determined to be generic, the district court refused to do 
so.119  The court reasoned that given section 37’s permissive language and that the 
defendant raised the cancellation issue on remand instead of as a counterclaim, the 
defendant was not entitled to have the registrations canceled by the court.120  The 
defendant must instead must petition the TTAB for cancellation, the court said.121 
Likewise, in CNA Financial Corp. v. Brown, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s refusal to cancel the plaintiff’s registrations despite the district 
court holding that the marks had been abandoned.122  The plaintiff, a holding com-
pany owning several insurance companies, registered a few marks on the Principal 
Register and alleged that the defendant infringed these marks.123  At trial, the de-
fendant successfully argued that the plaintiff’s marks had been abandoned because 
of naked licensing.124  Despite finding abandonment, the district court denied the 
defendant’s “cursory request” for cancellation.125  As it turns out, the defendant did 
not request cancellation as a counterclaim, but instead merely asked for cancella-
tion in its opening statement.126  This, the court implied, was insufficient.127 
In contrast to OBX-Stock, Grottanelli, and CNA Financial, the next two cases 
ultimately resulted in the appellate courts ordering the PTO to cancel the registra-
tions at issue.  The first case, Gracie v. Gracie, involved the mark GRACIE JIU-
JITSU for teaching and competing in the martial art of jiu-jitsu.128  The defendant, 
118  Id. at 546–47.  
119  Id. at 547.  
120  Id.  
121  Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 91 F. Supp. 2d 544, 547 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).  
122  CNA Fin. Corp. v. Brown, 162 F.3d 1334, 1337 n.4 (11th Cir. 1998). 
123  Id. at 1335–36.  
124  See id. at 1336. “Naked licensing” is licensing a mark without sufficient quality control over the 
licensee’s use of the mark.  Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 
595–96 (9th Cir. 2002).  Engaging in naked licensing results in a finding of abandonment.  Id. 
125  CNA Fin. Corp. v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 567, 576 (M.D. Fla. 1996). 
126  Initial Brief of Respondent-Appellees-Cross-Appellants at 43, CNA Fin. Corp. v. Brown, 162 
F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 1998) (No. 96-3119), 1997 WL 33570689, at *43. 
127  CNA Fin. Corp. v. Brown, 162 F.3d 1334, 1337 n.4 (11th Cir. 1998). 
128  Gracie v. Gracie, 217 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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Rorion Gracie, had registered GRACIE JIU-JITSU in 1989.129  The plaintiff, Car-
ley Gracie, who was also Rorion’s cousin, used the Gracie name in identifying his 
own jiu-jitsu business.130  Eventually, the family members had a falling out, and 
Carley sued Rorion on a variety of grounds, including cancellation of Rorion’s reg-
istration.131  Rorion counterclaimed for infringement.132  The jury found that 
Rorion’s mark was invalid, but the district court refused to exercise its power under 
section 37 to order cancellation of Rorion’s registration.133  Nonetheless, on post-
trial motions, the district court confirmed the jury’s findings and declared that 
Rorion did not have a valid mark for GRACIE JIU-JITSU.134  The Ninth Circuit 
reversed and held that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to cancel 
the invalid mark’s registration in light of the jury’s verdict.135  Importantly, and 
unlike the defendants in OBX-Stock, Grottanelli, and CNA Financial, Carley filed a 
claim for cancellation rather than just seeking cancellation in a motion or in open-
ing state
The second case, American Heritage Life Insurance Company v. Heritage 
Life Insurance Company, involved the word HERITAGE in the context of insur-
ance companies.136  The plaintiff, AHLIC, was an insurance company involved in 
the direct sale of insurance.137  The defendant, HLIC, initially operated as a rein-
surer but later became involved in the direct sale of insurance.138  AHLIC regis-
tered the mark HERITAGE for planning and underwriting life and health insurance, 
and eventually filed an infringement suit against HLIC.139  In response to the in-
129  Id.  
130  Id.  
131  Id. 
132  Id.  
133  Id.  The basis for invalidity is not certain, but from the briefs filed by the parties, it appears that 
the jury found Rorion’s mark to be either generic or descriptive without secondary meaning.  See, 
e.g., Principal Brief of Respondent-Appellees at 30–31, Gracie v. Gracie, 217 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 
2000) (No. C94-4156SC), 1999 WL 33612689, at *30–31. 
134  Gracie, 217 F.3d at 1064.  
135  Id. at 1065–66. 
136  Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 7 (5th Cir. 1974). 
137  Id.  
138  Id. 
139  Id. at 8.  
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fringement suit, HLIC filed a counterclaim for cancellation of AHLIC’s registra-
tion.140  After a full trial, the district court held AHLIC’s mark was either generic or 
merely descriptive without secondary meaning, but it denied HLIC’s cancellation 
counterclaim.141  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision 
that AHLIC’s mark was invalid as either generic or merely descriptive without sec-
ondary meaning.142  Regarding the district court’s refusal to exercise its power un-
der section 37, the Fifth Circuit reversed and held it was error to refuse to order the 
cancellation.143  Concluding this part of its opinion, the court noted that “[h]aving 
determined that the word ‘Heritage’ is generic or merely descriptive, and that it has 
not been endowed by AHLIC with secondary meaning sufficient to make the word 
distinctive, we believe that the Act’s purposes would be served by ordering the 
cancellation of the registration.”144  Like Carley in Gracie and unlike the defen-
dants in OBX-Stock, Grottanelli, and CNA Financial, HLIC filed a claim for can-
cellation rather than seeking cancellation in a motion or duri
To read these cases consistently so as not to create a split in the circuits, one 
can rely on the fact that in OBX-Stock, Grottanelli, and CNA Financial, the defen-
dants failed to assert cancellation as claims, whereas in Gracie and American Heri-
tage, the parties seeking cancellation did assert  claims.  I call this theory the miss-
ing-claim rule.145 
In further support of this theory are two cases with slightly different proce-
dural postures.  The first is Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corporation, 
where the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion ordering 
the PTO to dismiss a pending cancellation petition.146  The plaintiff, a Cuban in-
strumentality responsible for cigar sales, brought a trademark infringement suit 
140  Id. 
141  Id. at 7–8.  
142  Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 13 (5th Cir. 1974).  
143  Id. at 13–14.  
144  Id. at 14.  
145  Depending on who filed suit first and against whom, the claim for cancellation may be a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim.  For example, in Gracie, the cancellation was a claim rather than a 
counterclaim because declaratory relief was sought.  Ultimately, it does not matter if it is a coun-
terclaim, claim, or cross-claim.  Gracie v. Gracie, 217 F.3d 1060, 1064 (9th  Cir. 2000).  What 
matters is that a cause of action is asserted by one party against another. 
146  Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 541 F.3d 476, 477 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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against the defendant, an American cigar company, for using the mark COHIBA.147  
In addition, the plaintiff initiated a cancellation proceeding before the TTAB to 
cancel the defendant’s registration.148  The district court eventually dismissed the 
plaintiff’s claims but denied the defendant’s motion to have the TTAB dismiss the 
cancellation petition.149  The Second Circuit recognized that section 37 permitted 
the relief the defendant requested, but noted that the defendant did not request sec-
tion 37 relief as a counterclaim.150  The request was part of a motion to amend the 
judgment following the adjudication of the underlying trademark dispute and the 
district court’s dismissal of the action.151  The Second Circuit held that there was no 
abuse of discretion by the district court, despite the efficiency that would have been 
accomplished by ordering the PTO to follow the court’s lead.152  The defendant still 
had the ability to raise its arguments before the PTO.153  The failure to assert a sec-
tion 37 cancellation as a counterclaim was obviously weighing on the court’s mind.  
It mentioned the defendant’s lack of a counterclaim twice in the opinion and also 
noted that a request under section 37 is ordinarily made as a counterclaim in an in-
fringement suit.154 
The second case lending support to the missing-claim rule is Eagles, Ltd. v. 
American Eagle Foundation.155  In this case, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s denial of a motion to order the PTO to dismiss a trademark opposition based 
on the dismissal of the district court case.156  The plaintiff was the famous rock-
and-roll band, the Eagles.157  The band filed an infringement suit against the Ameri-
147  Id. 
148  Id.  
149  Id. at 477–78.  
150  Id. at 478.  
151  Id. 
152  Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 541 F.3d 476, 478–79 (2nd Cir. 2008). 
153  Id.  
154  Id.  
155  Eagles, Ltd. v. Am. Eagle Found., 356 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2004). 
156  Id. at 725.  
157  In his autobiography, comedian Steve Martin recounts a conversation with band member Glenn 
Frey where Frey is insistent that the name of the band is Eagles, not the Eagles.  See STEVE 
MARTIN, BORN STANDING UP: A COMIC’S LIFE 136 (2008).  However, a visit to the band’s web 
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can Eagle Foundation (AEF), a nonprofit organization dedicated to protecting 
American bald eagles.158  As part of its operations, AEF sold and promoted music-
related products, used the Internet domain name “eagles.org,” and had the vanity 
phone number (800) 2-EAGLES.159  AEF had also filed a trademark application 
with the PTO to register the mark AMERICAN EAGLE RECORDS, which the Ea-
gles opposed.160  Eventually, the district court dismissed the band’s claims with 
prejudice after several continuances and a voluntary dismissal just before trial.161  
AEF moved for an order directing the PTO to dismiss the plaintiff’s opposition.162  
The district court denied AEF’s motion, stating that AEF could always bring this 
claim before the PTO.163  The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to 
exercise its power under section 37 because the district court had not decided any 
issues regarding the mark’s validity.164  The appellate court also noted that the issue 
was not properly before the district court because AEF raised the issue for the first 
time in its motion and not as a counterclaim to the infringement action.165  Al-
though Empresa Cubana and Eagles present a different procedural posture from the 
cases described earlier, both support the notion that the missing-claim rule is a
There is one case threatening to present a split in the circuits on the issue of 
whether failure to plead a claim for cancellation is sufficient for a district court to 
refuse to exercise its section 37 powers.  In Sykes Laboratory, Inc. v. Kalvin, the 
plaintiff filed suit against the defendant for trademark infringement based on, inter 
alia, its nail hardener bottle design, which had been registered with the PTO.166  
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and requested an order cancel-
site, http://www.eaglesband.com, shows several instances where the band is referred to as “the 
istence, I will refer to the band as “the Eagles.” 
F.3d at 725–26. 
6.  
t 726.  
m. Eagle Found., 356 F.3d 724, 730 (6th Cir. 2004). 
s Lab., Inc. v. Kalvin, 610 F. Supp. 849, 851 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
Eagles.”  Despite Mr. Frey’s ins
158  Eagles, 356 
159  Id. at 725.  
160  Id. at 725–2
161  Id. a
162  Id.  
163  Id. at 730.  
164  Eagles, Ltd. v. A
165  Id. at 730–31.  
166  Syke
TIPLJ-18-2-4-Vacca-2.doc  3/8/2010  11:21:40 AM 
2010] Abolishing the Missing-Claim Rule 317 
 
ever appealed, so the Ninth Circuit 
never
he cir-
cuits will exist, and it should be resolved according to the proposal below.174 
 
ing the registration of the plaintiff’s bottle design.167  The defendant argued that the 
plaintiff’s registration should be canceled because either it was fraudulently ob-
tained or it was invalid as the bottle design was generic or merely descriptive with-
out secondary meaning.168  The court eventually concluded that the bottle design 
was an invalid mark because it had not acquired secondary meaning.169  Based on 
this finding of invalidity, the court ordered the registration canceled.170  What dis-
tinguishes Sykes from the cases where cancellation was ultimately ordered is that 
the court noted that the defendant did not file a claim in support of its request that 
the plaintiff’s registration be canceled.171  In rejecting this requirement, the court 
noted that a claim was not a prerequisite to canceling a registration under section 
37, and the fact that the defendant asserted cancellation as an affirmative defense 
was sufficient.172  Unfortunately, the case was n
 had the opportunity to address this issue. 
Because Sykes was only a district court opinion, there is no split in the cir-
cuits, and the missing-claim rule may accurately describe the current state of the 
law.  However, as explained infra, the state of the law is improper and should be 
corrected.173  If Sykes is correct and a claim is not required, then a split in t
167  Id.  
168  Id. at 859.  
169  Id. at 861–62 (“The critical question, then, is whether plaintiff succeeded in creating secondary 
meaning for its vial under section 2(f) of the Lanham Act. . . . All the evidence supports defen-
dants’ position that the plaintiff’s bottle design does not create a distinct commercial impression 
calling to mind Sykes Laboratory.”).  Because the court disposed of the issue on the basis of a lack 
of secondary meaning, it declined to address the basis that the registration was obtained fraudu-
lently.  Id. at 863 n.11. 
170  Id. at 863.  
171  Sykes Lab., Inc. v. Kalvin, 610 F. Supp 849, 863 n.10 (C.D. Cal. 1985).  
172  Id. at 863 n.10.  Because cancellation removes the benefits of registration but does not terminate 
trademark rights, it seems odd to assert cancellation as an affirmative defense.  Nonetheless, ac-
cepting a request for cancellation as an affirmative defense suggests that the Sykes court would 
have approved a request in other ways besides a claim. 
173  See infra Parts IV. B.–C.,V.  
174  See infra Part V.  
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 descriptive without secondary meaning.  The mark owner no longer has a 
valid 
 
r’s registration.  As discussed supra, the costs 
and p
the mark than to have the prevailing party initiate TTAB proceedings.  Not only is 
 
B. Extra Burdens 
One problem with courts refusing to cancel a registration unless cancellation 
is asserted as a claim is that the prevailing party in the litigation may have very lit-
tle incentive to initiate TTAB proceedings.  The prevailing party in such a suit has 
shown that the owner’s mark is invalid, perhaps by proving the mark was generic or 
merely
mark to assert against the prevailing party, and the prevailing party has a 
judgment in hand preventing the mark owner from bothering it about infringement. 
The prevailing party is then free use the mark without having to take any additional 
steps. 
If the prevailing party has no intention to register the mark itself175 or if the 
mark owner’s registration would not otherwise bar the prevailing party’s registra-
tion of its mark,176 then the prevailing party has no incentive to file a petition with 
the TTAB to cancel the mark owne
rocedures for a cancellation are similar to litigation in court.177  The prevail-
ing party in the infringement suit, having already spent a tremendous amount of 
time and money litigating the mark’s invalidity in court, would have no reason to 
spend additional resources for no gain.178 
Moreover, even if the prevailing party in the litigation did need to cancel the 
registration,179 it is more efficient for the court to order the PTO Director to cancel 
175  Perhaps the prevailing party’s mark is identical to the mark owner’s and the court found the mark 
to be generic.  In this situation, the prevailing party would have no reason to seek registration of 
its mark because its application would be denied. 
176  Perhaps the prevailing party’s mark is not confusingly similar to the mark owner’s mark and the 
prevailing party not only succeeded in showing a lack of likelihood of confusion, but also proved 
the mark owner’s mark was invalid.  In this situation, the prevailing party could register its mark 
without a risk of a likelihood of confusion with the registered mark.  Obviously, this result also 
fails to account for the public’s welfare as reflected by maintaining the Principal Register. 
177  See supra Part III.B. 
178  In fact, there could even be a disincentive to cancel the invalid registration if the prevailing party 
could not register the mark itself and wanted to keep the invalid mark on the Principal Register to 
discourage use by others coming across the mark in a search. 
179  For example, if the prevailing party’s mark and the mark owner’s registered mark would be con-
fusingly similar, the mark owner’s registration would bar the prevailing party from registering its 
mark, and the basis for invalidity of the mark owner’s mark was that it was merely descriptive 
without secondary meaning, then the prevailing party might want to have the registration canceled 
so the prevailing party could attempt to register its mark with a showing of secondary meaning. 
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three TTAB judges and their staff to spend time reviewing the documents, discuss-
 when the same result can be reached by the court 
order
 trademark law’s main purposes: 
increa
Second, if the prevailing party were to initiate cancellation proceedings before 
the TTAB, then this would cost the prevailing party time and money, including the 
 
it more efficient vis-à-vis the prevailing party’s resources, but it is also more effi-
cient vis-à-vis the government’s resources.  There is no sound reason to require
ing the case, and writing orders
ing the PTO to cancel the registration. 
C. Effect on the Public 
An additional problem with a court refusing to exercise its power under sec-
tion 37 unless the party seeking cancellation files a claim is that it imposes an addi-
tional cost on the public.  This can occur in two ways.  First, if the prevailing party 
refuses to initiate a cancellation proceeding, then the mark owner’s invalid mark 
remains on the Principal Register.180  As noted earlier, the Principal Register serves 
as the public record of registered marks and aims to allow businesses to easily 
search and determine what marks are available.181  If the Principal Register lists the 
invalid mark as registered, then businesses searching the Principal Register and 
hoping to use that mark will find that the mark is registered.  Because the Principal 
Register does not indicate that the prevailing party successfully proved the owner’s 
mark was invalid, the searching businesses may be unaware of this fact and will 
have to devote additional resources to searching for and selecting a mark, or put re-
sources towards uncovering the invalid mark’s true status.  Unknown to these busi-
nesses, the additional costs are unnecessary, and they can use the improperly regis-
tered mark.  The businesses that have expended additional resources in searching 
for a mark must now recoup those costs, resulting in higher prices for their products 
and services.  Alternatively, these resources are no longer available to invest in fu-
ture product development.  Higher prices and impeding product development are 
not good for consumers and run contrary to one of
sing consumer welfare.182  Similarly, the mark owner whose registration is 
not canceled but who continues to use the mark may use the registration to harass 
others so they will refrain from using the mark.183 
180  See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 20:40 (noting that cancellation is initiated by one who is or will 
be damaged by the registration). 
181  See supra Part II. 
182  See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 29, at 466–67.  
183  Of course, this would be an empty threat, but the unknowing third parties may opt to continue on 
with their searches rather than become embroiled in a dispute with the mark owner. 
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e products because of diminished of resources.  
Both results are harmful to consumers. 
V. 
n, or 
as an
e courts should be encouraged to exercise 
their 
ctices and standards, 
Congress should amend section 37 to reflect these proposals. 
 
filing fees and attorneys’ fees.  The prevailing party might try to recoup these addi-
tional costs, which could result in higher prices for its products or services184 or 
impede the development of futur
Reforming Judicial Cancellations 
To fix the problems associated with maintaining invalid marks on the Princi-
pal Register, I propose the following multi-part solution.  First, the missing-claim 
rule—the requirement that a party needs to request cancellation under section 37 as 
a claim—should be abolished.  A party should be allowed to request this relief at 
any point and in any manner during the litigation.  This request could be made as 
part of the relief sought on a summary judgment motion, in a post-trial motio
 affirmative defense, or could even be raised for the first time on appeal. 
Second, courts should exercise their power to order cancellation under section 
37 sua sponte if the party has successfully proven the invalidity of the mark.  Even 
if the party fails to request cancellation, th
section 37 power in this situation.185 
Third, a court’s failure to order cancellation after a registered mark has been 
proved invalid, should be treated as a per se abuse of discretion.  The appellate 
courts can serve as a backstop, furthering policy concerns if the district court fails 
to cancel the mark (either at the party’s request after invalidity has been proven or 
sua sponte).  If the courts are unwilling to adopt these pra
184  Charging a higher price to consumers is only a minor concern.  These additional costs would 
probably be negligible when large economies of scale are in effect, which would probably occur 
in many instances. 
185  To be sure, the easiest way to ensure the registration is canceled is for the prevailing party, or 
more precisely the prevailing party’s attorney, to request cancellation.  Whether a failure by the at-
torney to request cancellation would amount to malpractice is an interesting question.  Malpractice 
would shift some of the costs to the responsible person (the attorney).  Presumably, the damages 
would be the costs associated with pursuing a cancellation proceeding before the TTAB.  How-
ever, there may not be damages in some cases because the prevailing party in the trademark litiga-
tion may not care too much if the registration is canceled.  See supra notes 175–176 and accom-
panying text.  In those circumstances, malpractice would not be pursued.  There are some 
circumstances where the prevailing party would want the registration canceled, and malpractice 
could be appropriate in those circumstances.  See supra note 179.  Nonetheless, malpractice would 
not resolve the problems associated with efficiencies and benefitting the public.  For these rea-
sons, relying on malpractice to remedy the problems is an incomplete solution. 
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A. An Appropriate Balance of Costs 
One objection to mandatory cancellation under section 37 may be that we do 
not want to add to the already overburdened judiciary.186  This is not a justified 
concern.  Courts exercising their section 37 cancellation powers will have already 
decided the issue of validity during the course of the underlying litigation.  The 
courts will not be required to review additional evidence or hear additional argu-
ments.  These facts will have already been presented, and the legal issue will have 
already been decided.  Other than ordering the PTO Director to record the cancella-
tion,187 there is no additional work to be done by the court.  Ordering the PTO to 
record the cancellation is not an involved process.  The court clerk merely stamps a 
copy of the order to certify it and mails it to the PTO.188  In fact, the courts already 
have an existing burden to correspond with the PTO.  Section 34(c) of the Lanham 
Act requires the court clerk to notify the PTO Director of any judgments entered 
with respect to a registered mark.189  Because the court already has a duty to notify 
the PTO of the judgment, it is no additional work to order the cancellation. 
Moreover, the costs of ordering the Director to record the cancellation are 
clearly outweighed by the burden placed on the TTAB of having to conduct the 
cancellation proceeding.  Costs to the TTAB (staff and judges) include processing 
the petition, reviewing the evidence, ruling on any motions filed before final dispo-
sition of the case, and drafting an opinion deciding the issue.190  It makes little 
sense to impose such costs on the TTAB when the same outcome would result if 
the district court had simply ordered the cancellation under section 37.  Therefore, 
by abolishing the missing-claim rule and requiring courts to exercise their power 
under section 37, the proper balance is struck between imposing the cancellation 
costs on the courts and the
What about claim preclusion or issue preclusion?  Perhaps one or both of 
these doctrines could be used by the party seeking cancellation or the TTAB to lim-
186  See C.J. JOHN G. ROBERTS, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., 2008 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 10–13 (2008), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2008year-
endreport.pdf (describing a 5% increase in federal appeals and a 4% increase in both civil and 
criminal cases in U.S. district courts). 
187  Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946 § 37, 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (2006). 
188  Thanks to the Clerk’s Office in the U.S. District Court in the Northern District of Illinois for ex-
plaining the process.  Interview with Clerk’s office, U.S. Dist.Court N.D. Ill. (May 22, 2008). 
189  15 U.S.C. § 1116(c). 
190  See generally TBMP, supra note 79, § 102.03. 
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it their expenditure of resources.  Claim preclusion is where “a judgment on the me-
rits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies 
based on the same cause of action.”191  Issue preclusion, on the other hand, applies 
when “the second action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the 
prior suit precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the out-
come of the first action.”192  Both doctrines promote efficiency by minimizing the 
amount of redundant litigation.193  If the prevailing party in the judicial proceeding 
could rely on one of these doctrines to show that registrant’s trademark had previ-
ously been proved invalid, then the TTAB could be relieved of much of its duties.  
No factual findings or legal conclusions would need to be made about the mark’s 
validity; the court would have already performed that step. 
It is unlikely that claim preclusion can be successfully invoked by the party 
seeking cancellation.  In Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Systems, the Federal Circuit 
rejected the applicability of claim preclusion.194  The court held that a finding of 
non-infringement was not based on the same transactional facts as a cancellation.195  
In particular, the court held that the following differences bar the applicability of 
claim preclusion: 
[(1)] infringement requires the defendant to have used the allegedly infringing 
words or symbols in commerce and in connection with the sale or promotion of 
goods or services, cancellation requires none of these; 
[(2)] cancellation requires the respondent[] to hold a federally registered mark, 
infringement does not; and 
[(3)] cancellation requires inquiry into the registrability of the respondent’s mark, 
infringement does not.196 
191  Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979). 
192  Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) (“When an issue of fact or law is 
actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential 
to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, 
whether on the same or a different claim.”). 
193  See 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 4402 (2d ed. 2002). 
194  Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 223 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
195  Id. at 1364. 
196  Id.  The court also noted that infringement requires the plaintiff to have a valid registered mark, 
while cancellation does not.  Id.  This is an inaccurate statement.  Infringement can be based on 
common-law trademarks that are not federally registered.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2006). 
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Ultimately, the Federal Circuit held that these “differences in transactional facts 
conclusively demonstrate[d] that claim preclusion cannot serve to bar a petition for 
cancellation based upon an earlier infringement proceeding.”197  In STMicroelec-
tronics, Inc. v. Nartron Corporation, the TTAB relied on Jet and refused to cancel 
the registration on the basis of claim preclusion.198  It did so even though a district 
court previously found the registered mark to be generic, and its decision was sub-
sequently affirmed by the court of appeals.199  Based on the holdings of Jet and 
STMicroelectronics, it would be difficult for a party who successfully proved the 
registrant’s mark was invalid to rely on claim preclusion to minimize the costs of 
pursuing a cancellation before the TTAB. 
Issue preclusion is a different story and may help a party who has successfully 
proved invalidity of the registrant’s mark.  Four elements are required to establish 
issue preclusion: (1) the issues were identified in a prior proceeding; (2) the issues 
were actually litigated; (3) the determination of the issues was necessary to the re-
sulting judgment; and (4) the party defending against preclusion had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issues.200 
Issue preclusion seems particularly apt for the successful litigant in a judicial 
proceeding.  Where a court finds a mark invalid and denies enforcement, typically 
all four elements are met.  In the judicial proceeding, the validity of the registrant’s 
mark was an issue.  This same issue is presented in the cancellation.  The validity 
issue was actually litigated in the judicial proceeding because the court specifically 
ruled on the issue.  The determination of the mark’s validity was necessary to the 
resulting judgment as an invalid mark strips the mark owner of any rights in the 
mark and makes it impossible to prove the first element of an infringement case.  
Finally, the mark owner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the mark’s valid-
ity.201 
Such a situation existed in International Order of Job’s Daughters v. Linde-
burg & Company.202  In Lindeburg, the registrant, Job’s Daughters, sued Lindeburg 
197  Jet, 223 F.3d at 1364. 
198  STMicroelectronics, Inc., Cancellation No. 92042527, 2005 WL 1285675, at *3 (T.T.A.B. May 
17, 2005). 
199  Id. at *1, *5.  
200  Jet, 223 F.3d at 1366. 
201  This assumes there were no procedural irregularities in the trial court proceeding. 
202  Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 727 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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for trademark infringement for using its trademarks on jewelry.203  Although the 
district court found for Job’s Daughters, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that 
Job’s Daughters’ mark was merely a functional aesthetic component of the jewelry 
and did not serve as a trademark.204  Lindeburg eventually filed a petition with the 
TTAB to cancel Job’s Daughters’ federal registration and five months later filed a 
motion for summary judgment based on the Ninth Circuit’s previous ruling that the 
marks were invalid.205  Five months after that, the TTAB granted the motion for 
summary judgment and canceled the registration.206  Job’s Daughters, on appeal 
from the TTAB ruling, challenged the grant of summary judgment, but the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s order finding that issue preclusion was correctly ap-
plied.207  Based on Lindeburg, issue preclusion could be successfully invoked by 
the party seeking cancellation.  In STMicroelectronics, for example, although the 
TTAB refused to cancel the registration on the basis of claim preclusion, it did so 
on the basis of issue preclusion.208 
Of course, if any element establishing issue preclusion were missing, then the 
party seeking cancellation would not be able to take advantage of this cost-saving 
doctrine and would be forced to bear all the expenses normally associated with a 
cancellation.209  Nonetheless, even if the party seeking cancellation is able to take 
advantage of the issue preclusion doctrine, this is an insufficient reason for reject-
ing the proposed reforms to judicial cancellations.  There are still substantial costs 
associated with the cancellation compared with the relative ease of the court order-
ing the PTO Director to record the cancellation.210  The party seeking cancellation 
must still draft and file the petition and a motion for summary judgment arguing 
203  Id. at 1089.  
204  Id.  
205  Id. 
206  Id.  
207  Id.  at 1092.  
208  STMicroelectronics, Inc., Cancellation No. 92042527, 2005 WL 1285675, at *4–5 (T.T.A.B. May 
17, 2005). 
209  On remand in Jet, the TTAB refused to apply issue preclusion, finding there was not identity of 
the issues because of the differences in the TTAB looking at all normal marketing channels of the 
product bearing the mark, whereas courts only inquire into the actual marketing channels used by 
the registrant.  See Jet, Inc., Cancellation No. 25,587, 2003 WL 355736, at *4 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 13, 
2003). 
210  See generally 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 20:40 (discussing cancellation by both procedures). 
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that issue preclusion is applicable.211  Moreover, the TTAB staff and judges must 
still process and review the pleadings, analyze the applicability of issue preclusion, 
and prepare an order on that basis.212  These costs, to both the parties and TTAB, 
far outweigh the negligible cost to the courts of ordering the cancellation. 
B. Benefits the Public 
Besides striking an appropriate balance of costs between courts, the TTAB, 
and the parties, adopting an automatic cancellation practice upon a finding of inva-
lidity would benefit the public.  As discussed supra, if district courts refuse to exer-
cise their section 37 power, the prevailing party in the judicial proceeding may 
simply refuse to initiate the cancellation proceeding.213  This leaves the invalid 
mark on the Principal Register and raises the search costs for other businesses who 
are considering using the invalid mark.214  If courts were required to exercise their 
section 37 power to cancel the invalid mark, then the Principal Register would be 
cleared of litigated invalid marks and would more accurately reflect the availability 
of marks, thus lowering the search costs for businesses.  These lower search costs 
help avoid unnecessary price increases and  enable businesses to dedicate additional 
resources to product development, both of which increase consumer welfare—the 
ultimate purpose of trademark law.215   
In the event the prevailing party does seek cancellation before the TTAB, the 
process will cost it time and money.216  If cancellation is sought and the costs are 
not minimal relative to production and sales, the party may try to recoup these 
costs, resulting in higher prices for consumers.217  Instead, these resources could be 
used elsewhere, such as in the development of better products or services.  By re-
quiring the district court to automatically exercise its section 37 power, the prevail-
ing party need not expend the additional resources to cancel the mark.  Regardless 
of which scenario ultimately plays out, abolishing the missing-claim rule and re-
211  See, e.g., Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindberg & Co., 727 F.2d 1087, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1984); 
STMicroelectronics, 2005 WL 1285675, at *1–2. 
212  See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, § 20:132 (discussing procedures for summary judgment and ap-
plicability to collateral estoppel and res judicata). 
213  See supra Part IV.B. 
214  See supra Part IV.C.  
215  See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 29, at 466–67. 
216  See supra Parts III.B., IV.C. 
217  See supra Part IV.C. 
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quiring courts to exercise their power under section 37 helps trademark law achieve 
its consumer welfare goals. 
C. Inapplicable Sua Sponte Concerns 
The sua sponte aspect of these proposals may be bothersome to some.  The 
judiciary itself has been conflicted in its feelings towards sua sponte action.218  
Three main objections to sua sponte actions exist: first, that sua sponte action un-
dermines the adversarial system;219  second, that sua sponte action threatens due 
process;220  and third, that sua sponte action harms the view that courts are neutral, 
rather than partisan.221  These objections are inapplicable to the exercise of section 
37 power sua sponte. 
A fundamental premise underlying the adversarial system is that allowing the 
parties to present evidence and arguments to the court will render more accurate 
decisions.222  As Professor Fuller explains: 
218  Compare Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.) (“The premise of our 
adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and re-
search, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before 
them.”), with Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 464 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he re-
fusal to consider arguments not raised is a sound prudential practice, rather than a statutory or 
constitutional mandate, and there are times when prudence dictates the contrary.”).  See generally 
Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an Opportunity 
to Be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 1256–59 (2002) (discussing inconsistency among 
courts regarding sua sponte rulings). 
219  Miller, supra note 218, at 1260 (“The fundamental core of due process is that a party should have 
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before a claim is decided.  The adversary system 
is based on the premise that allowing the parties to address the court on the decisive issue in-
creases the accuracy of the decision.  In addition, it increases the parties’ sense that the court’s 
process and result are fair.”); see also Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A 
Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 272 (2002) 
(“Deciding cases sua sponte is also inconsistent with the American judicial system’s reliance on 
the adversary process.”). 
220  Miller, supra note 218, at 1260; see also Milani & Smith, supra note 219, at 263 (“Thus, [sua 
sponte] decisions are fundamentally inconsistent with the due process guarantees of the United 
States Constitution.”). 
221  Miller, supra note 218, at 1260. 
222  Miller, supra note 218 at 1260; see also Milani & Smith, supra note 219, at 273 (“The fundamen-
tal premise underlying the adversary system is that a court is more likely to reach the ‘correct’ de-
cision because the advocates will uncover and present more useful information and arguments to 
the decision makers than the court would develop on its own.”). 
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[B]efore a judge can gauge the full force of an argument, it must be presented to 
him with partisan zeal by one not subject to the restraints of judicial office.  The 
judge cannot know how strong an argument is until he has heard it from the lips 
of one who has dedicated all the powers of his mind to its formulation.223 
Although there may be merit to this objection, it is inapplicable to the scenario im-
plicated by my proposals.  Exercising cancellation power under section 37 sua 
sponte would take place only after the judge has determined that the registered 
mark is invalid.  At this point, there are no additional issues left to decide.  The par-
ties have presented their evidence on the mark’s validity and have argued why the 
mark is valid or not.  An additional opportunity to present evidence or arguments 
would be wasteful.  The court has already evaluated the evidence relevant to valid-
ity, and the same analysis would apply if the party requested cancellation initially.  
Thus, there is no harm to the adversarial system. 
The second objection to sua sponte actions is that it threatens due process.224  
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.”225  The Supreme Court has noted many 
times that the right of due process guarantees, at a minimum, the right to be 
heard.226  Although a court canceling a registration under section 37 could raise due 
process concerns, the situation where sua sponte cancellation would be mandated is 
limited to those scenarios where the court has already been presented with evidence 
and arguments concerning the mark’s validity.  In this situation, the parties have al-
ready had the opportunity to be heard.  Because of this opportunity, the concerns 
over due process are illegitimate. 
The final objection to sua sponte actions is that it harms the belief that courts 
are neutral rather than partisan, thus disrupting the sense that  court processes and 
223  Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 36 (Harold J. Berman ed., 
1972). 
224  Milani & Smith, supra note 219, at 262–65. 
225  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Fourteenth Amendment provides the same vis-à-vis the states, but 
because the federal government is taking away the registration, state action is not involved. 
226  Milani & Smith, supra note 219, at 263; see also, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (“Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract 
words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that 
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for 
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”); Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 
797 n.4 (1996) (“The opportunity to be heard is an essential requisite of due process of law in ju-
dicial proceedings.”); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (“The fundamental requisite of 
due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.”). 
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results are fair.227  The belief that courts are neutral and fair and the consequent ac-
ceptance of judicial decisions occurs because “a party who is ‘intimately involved 
in the adjudicatory process and feels that he has been given a fair opportunity to 
present his case . . . is likely to accept the results whether favorable or not.’”228  In 
contrast, sua sponte action undermines acceptance of courts’ decisions because the 
parties will not feel like they have been given a fair opportunity to present their 
case.229  The basis for this objection is the same as the due process objections: a 
lack of an opportunity to be heard.  For the same reason already enumerated, this 
threat to acceptance of judicial decisions is inapplicable because the parties have 
had an opportunity to present their case to the judge in the context of the underlying 
litigation.  Once the parties have presented their case on the validity issue, there is 
no reason for the mark owner to feel that the proceedings were less fair simply be-
cause the court ordered the Principal Register to be rectified. 
In sum, the standard objections to sua sponte actions are misplaced when ap-
plied to courts exercising their section 37 power sua sponte as proposed in this arti-
cle.  The fact that the mark owner will have had an opportunity to present evidence 
and arguments concerning the mark’s validity eases any concerns that the court is 
without full knowledge, depriving the mark owner of due process, or threatening 
the public’s confidence in courts’ decisions. 
D. Statutory Interpretation 
Besides the efficiencies of the proposals in this article, another benefit is that 
these reforms can be implemented without the need for the courts to engage in crea-
tive statutory interpretation.  Section 14 of the Lanham Act describes how cancella-
tion before the TTAB is commenced and requires a party to file a “petition to can-
cel a registration of a mark.”230  In contrast, section 37 is written in broader 
language and gives the courts authority to order cancellations without regard to 
whether a petition was filed.231  The only requirement under section 37 is that the 
action involve a registered mark.232  Because the restrictive petition-filing language 
227  Milani & Smith, supra note 219, at 278.  
228  Milani & Smith, supra note 219, at 283–84 (quoting STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON 
ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 34 (1988)). 
229  Milani & Smith, supra note 219, at 284.  
230  Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2006). 
231  See 15 U.S.C. § 1119. 
232  Id.  
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is absent from section 37, courts have no need to read in such a limitation.  In fact, 
the absence of such language from section 37 and its presence in section 14 suggest 
the contrary: that a claim is not required under section 37.  Thus, the clear language 
of section 37 allows the courts to implement the first proposal, abolition of the 
missing-claim rule, without contorting the statutory language.   
Moreover, Rule 15(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure supports ab-
olishing the missing-claim rule.233  Rule 15(b)(2) provides: 
When an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried by the parties’ express or im-
plied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if raised in the pleadings.  A 
party may move—at any time, even after judgment—to amend the pleadings to 
conform them to the evidence and to raise an unpleaded issue.  But failure to 
amend does not affect the result of the trial of that issue.234 
The rule’s final sentence would allow a court to order cancellation under section 37 
even if the prevailing party failed to assert a claim for cancellation.  The issue of 
validity would have been tried by implied consent—namely, the prevailing party’s 
introduction of evidence relating to invalidity without objection of the mark own-
er.235 
233  To be sure, Rules 15(a)(2) or 15(d) can serve as stopgap measures to the problems created by the 
missing-claim rule.  The courts can allow the party seeking cancellation to amend or supplement 
the earlier pleading and assert a claim for cancellation.  However, Rule 15 is not a complete solu-
tion to the problem, as it requires the party to actively request cancellation and still gives the court 
discretion as to whether leave should be granted.  Presumably, the courts would exercise their dis-
cretion similar to the way they have exercised their discretion under section 37.  In fact, this is ex-
actly what occurred in CNA Financial.  CNA Fin. Corp. v. Brown, 162 F.3d 1334, 1337 n.4 (11th 
Cir. 1998).  The Eleventh Circuit treated the defendant’s request for cancellation during opening 
statements as a request for leave to amend to file a counterclaim.  Id.  The Eleventh Circuit re-
fused to characterize the district court’s denial of leave to amend as an abuse of discretion because 
“of the untimely nature of [the] request, and the possible prejudice to [the plaintiff] of introducing 
a counter-claim for the first time at trial.”  Id.  The court failed to point out how the claim would 
be untimely and what prejudice the plaintiff might have suffered.  This is the same mistake courts 
make when refusing to cancel registrations under section 37 when the marks are already held inva-
lid. 
234  FED. R. CIV. P. 15(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
235  Courts have, however, regularly denied amendments to the pleadings where evidence is relevant 
to an issue already in the case in addition to the new issue and there has been no indication at trial 
that the party introducing the evidence is seeking to raise a new issue.  The reasoning behind this 
rule is that if evidence is introduced in support of issues that have been pleaded, then the party op-
posing the new issue may not have notice of its relevance.  6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR 
R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1493 (2d ed. 1990).  It 
could be argued that cancellation was not tried by implied consent because the evidence concern-
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The second proposal, requiring courts to order cancellations when the invalid-
ity of the registered mark has been established, can also be read consistently with 
the language of section 37.  In an action involving a registered mark, section 37 
says, “the court may determine the right to registration, order the cancelation of 
registrations, in whole or in part, restore canceled registrations, and otherwise rec-
tify the register with respect to the registrations of any party to the action.”236  Al-
though a mandatory rule requiring district courts to cancel a registration when the 
mark has been proven invalid could use the phrase “shall determine” rather than 
“may determine,” the use of “may determine” reflects the understanding that situa-
tions may arise in which a mark may be found invalid, but the courts may not want 
to intervene and efficiencies may not be gained by doing so.  In these situations, we 
want to let the courts refuse to exercise their section 37 powers.  Thus, requiring 
courts to order cancellation when the registered mark is found to be invalid can be 
read consistently with section 37’s permissive language; the permissive language is 
applicable to situations other than when the registered mark is found to be invalid. 
Finally, the third proposal, characterizing a failure to order cancellation when 
a mark has been found to be invalid as a per se abuse of discretion, can be imple-
mented under section 37’s current language.  Section 37 is silent as to the standard 
of review and provides no guidance as to when the district court has abused its dis-
cretion. 
Despite the fact that the judiciary can implement the proposals described 
herein within the existing language of section 37 and without the need for Congres-
sional intervention, Congress can easily remedy the courts’ failure to do so.  To im-
plement these proposals, section 37 could be amended as follows: 
In any action involving a registered mark the court may determine the right to 
registration, order the cancelation of registrations, in whole or in part, restore 
canceled registrations, and otherwise rectify the register with respect to the regis-
ing invalidity for purposes of cancellation was relevant to an issue already in the case (i.e. whether 
the mark owner had an enforceable mark—the first element of a trademark infringement claim).  
The cases refusing amendment are distinguishable from the situation presented in this article be-
cause in the cases where the amendment was not permitted, the opposing party planned its argu-
ments on the pleaded case, but the arguments would not have fully addressed the newly raised is-
sues.  See Otness v. United States, 23 F.R.D. 279 (D. Alaska 1959).  In contrast, the situation 
presented in this article involves an already existing issue (validity) and the newly raised issue of 
cancellation, which are identical for purposes of the mark owner’s ability to address each issue.  
The mark owner’s planning and preparation for a case concerning invalidity of the mark is unaf-
fected by the issue of cancellation.  The mark owner need not undertake any additional planning 
or preparation. 
236  Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946 § 37, 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (2006). 
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trations of any party to the action.  Upon finding a registered mark to be invalid, 
the court shall order the registration or registrations canceled regardless of the 
form or presence of a request by a party.  Decrees and orders shall be certified by 
the court to the Director, who shall make appropriate entry upon the records of 
the Patent and Trademark Office, and shall be controlled thereby.237 
This amendment to section 37 would expressly eliminate the missing-claim rule by 
noting that the form of a request for cancellation is irrelevant.  This amendment al-
so clarifies that the court must exercise this power sua sponte by noting that the 
presence of a request by a party is not a requirement and using mandatory language.  
Finally, the mandatory language “shall order” indicates to the appellate courts that a 
failure to do so is error as a matter of law.  Again, Congressional action is not nec-
essary; the courts can implement these changes on their own.  But to the extent the 
courts fail to do so, Congress should step in and instruct them accordingly. 
VI. Conclusion 
The courts’ power to “rectify the register” under section 37 is a tool for effi-
ciency.  Not only does it create efficiencies by avoiding duplicate litigation, it cre-
ates efficiencies in the production of goods and services, ultimately to the benefit of 
consumers.  This tool is consistent with trademark law’s purpose.  In contrast, the 
courts’ missing-claim rule has erected barriers to section 37’s efficiencies.238  By 
abolishing the missing-claim rule, requiring the courts to exercise their power if the 
registered mark has been proven invalid, and establishing a per se abuse of discre-
tion standard, section 37 will maximize efficiencies as well as benefit the public 
and administrative trademark system without imposing an undue burden on the 
courts.239 
Although sua sponte action generally causes discomfort because of concerns 
about due process, giving deference to the adversarial system, and maintaining the 
judicial system’s legitimacy, these concerns are inapplicable to the proposals in this 
article.240  Because the issue of trademark validity will have already been argued 
and determined by the court, the trademark owner will not be deprived of an oppor-
237  Emphasis added to illustrate modifications. 
238  See supra Part IV.B.–C.  
239  See supra Part V.  
240  See supra Part V.C.  
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tunity to be heard and will have participated in educating the court on the validity 
issue.241 
Finally, the existing text of section 37 permits courts to implement the 
changes proposed in this article without having to contort the statutory language.242  
To the extent the courts refuse to adopt these proposals, Congress should step in 
and amend section 37, as proposed, so the courts will rectify the register and maxi-
mize efficiency.243 
Historically, there has not been a large number of cases where courts have re-
fused to cancel have despite the mark being invalid.  However, the increasing num-
ber of cases over the past decade supporting the missing-claim rule suggests that 
the missing-claim rule is a relatively new but rapidly spreading judicial require-
ment.  Courts should not wait for the problem and its ill effects to grow.  The pro-
posals in this article would put them on the right track. 
241  See supra Part V.C. 
242  See supra Part V.D. 
243  See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
